Synopsis

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1981-1982

INTRODUCTION

This synopsis outlines significant developments in immigration
law from October 1981, through July 1982.1 The Supreme Court
ruled on the following issues: public education for illegal aliens;
alien ineligibility to become peace officers; deportation of alien
eyewitnesses; the Freedom of Information Act; and applicability
of Title VII to foreign companies in the United States.
The lower courts continued to divide on such issues as collateral attacks on deportation orders, estoppel, and the degree of discretion exercised by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
The courts reviewed cases involving the statutory requirements
for suspension of deportation, adjustment of status, entry and exclusion, and naturalization.
Congress passed legislation designed to expedite administrative
action. Proposed legislation has been introduced by both the Reagan administration and individual representatives.
1. The October 1981 starting date corresponds to the commencement of the
United States Supreme Court's 1981-82 term. This date also coincides with the
ending of the previous synopsis article. See 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 195 (1981).
The July 1982 ending date coincides with the adjournment of the Supreme Court's
1981-82 term. The final decisions of the Court were announced on July 2, 1982.
December 1982

Vol. 20

No. 1

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

During the 1981-1982 Term, the Supreme Court decided five
cases 2 in the area of immigration law and delayed one decision
until the 1982-1983 Term. 3 The Court denied review in twelve
4
other significant cases in various areas of immigration law.
PLYLER

v. DOE

In Plyler v. Doe 5 and Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed
Undocumented Alien Children,6 the Court held that the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment extends to illegal
aliens who may not be denied a public education.
In 1975, the Texas legislature authorized local school districts to
deny enrollment in their public schools to children not legally admitted into the country.7 The lower federal courts upheld the
constitutional challenges to this statute based on the equal protection clause. 8
The Court held that whatever his status under immigration
laws, an alien is a '"person" in the ordinary sense of the term as
used in the fourteenth amendment, 9 which provides that "no state
shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 0 The Court found that "within its jurisdiction"
was formulated in a broad sense to guarantee equal protection to
all who are within the boundaries of a state and subject to its
laws."
The Court declined to classify undocumented alien children as
a suspect class because their illegal status is not a "constitutional
irrelevancy."' 2 Because the Texas statute imposes a major hard2. Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed Undocumented Alien Children,
rev'd sub nom., Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982) (cases consolidated on appeal);
United States Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co., 102 S. Ct. 1957 (1982);
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct. 735 (1982); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 102 S. Ct. 3440

(1982).
3. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3211
(U.S. October 6, 1981) (No. 80-1832). See infra notes 104-39 and accompanying text.

4. For a discussion of these twelve cases, see infra notes 43-44.
5. 102 S.Ct. 2382 (1982).
6. Id. (cases consolidated on appeal).
7. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1981).
8. For additional background on these decisions, see Synopsis, Significant
Developments in the Immigration Laws of the United States: 1980-1981, 19 SAN DiEGO L. REV. 195, 202-05 (1981).
9. 102 S. Ct. at 2391.

10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
11. 102 S. Ct. at 2393.
12. Id. at 2398. An example of constitutional irrelevancy is race. The illegal
presence of the aliens is relevant to a determination of their rights under the Con-
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ship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status, the Court held that the statute must be justified by a
13
showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. The
Court refused to grant the Texas legislation deference when it re-

jected the three colorable state interests proposed by the state.14
CABELL V. CHAVEZ-SALIDO

In Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,'5 the Court held that lawfully adnitted permanent resident aliens have no constitutional right to
become peace officers in California. The opinion sustained the
state's statutory citizenship requirement mandating United States
citizenship as a prerequisite to occupying any state, county, or local governmental position. 16 The alien plaintiffs who were denied
jobs as deputy probation officers had successfully challenged the
constitutionality of the statute on equal protection grounds in the
stitution. An example is the "citizen" and "person" characterization in the fourteenth amendment.
13. 102 S. Ct. at 2402. Although the Court continued its refusal to view education as a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973), the Court reaffirmed the
pivotal role of education in our society, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954).
14. 102 S.Ct. at 2400-02. The three state interests proposed by Texas and the
reasons for rejection by the Supreme Court were:
1. Texas sought to protect the state from an influx of illegal aliens which
it asserted would result from the irresistable lure of free education.
The Court found no evidence that illegal aliens imposed a burden on
Texas' economy and established that there were less restrictive alternatives available to stop the influx of illegal aliens such as prohibiting
their employment.
2. Texas claimed educating illegal aliens decreased the quality of education which the schools can provide. The Court found children illegally
present to be indistinguishable from legal resident alien children in
terms of costs and needs. In addition, Texas supplied no evidence to
support its claim.
3. Texas contended singling out illegal aliens to deny them public schooling was appropriate because the group is less likely to use its education within the state. The Court found the budgetary savings slight
when compared to the burden eventually imposed on the state by the
creation of a subclass of illiterates who would substantially increase
costs resulting from unemployment, crime and welfare.
Id.
15. 102 S.Ct. 735 (1982).
16. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1031(a) (West 1980) requires "public officers or employees declared by law to be peace officers" to be citizens of the United States; CAL.
PENAL CODE § 830.5 (West 1980) provides that probation officers and deputy probation officers are "peace officers."

district court.17
The Court distinguished the standard of review applied to economic functions from that applied to political or governmental
functions. While the Court retained heightened judicial scrutiny
for restrictions on lawful resident aliens that affect an economic
interest, it concluded that strict scrutiny is inappropriate when
the restriction primarily serves a political function.18
The Court applied the two-step process under Sugarman v.
Dougall19 to determine which function a particular restriction
serves. First, specificity of the classification must be examined, as
a classification that is substantially over- or underinclusive tends
to undercut the government's claim that the classification serves
legitimate political ends. The Court found California's statute sufficiently tailored to withstand a facial challenge. Justification
arose from the general law enforcement characteristics that all
peace officers can make arrests and are trained to use firearms.
Second, even if the classification is sufficiently tailored under
the Sugarman test, it may be applied only to persons holding
state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, or
judicial positions. The Court found that the functions of California probation officers "sufficiently partake of the sovereign power
to exercise coercive force over the individual that they may be
limited to citizens." 20 The Court concluded that the citizenship
requirement was "an appropriate limitation on those who would
exercise and, therefore, symbolize this power of the political
community.' 21
The Court held: "The exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes is not a deficiency in the democratic system but
a necessary consequence of the community's process of political
self-definition.... Aliens are by definition those outside of this
22
community."
UNITED STATES v. VALENZUELA-BERNAL

In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,2 3 the Supreme Court
ruled that prompt deportation of illegal aliens did not violate fifth
and sixth amendment rights24 of a criminal defendant charged
17. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 490 F. Supp. 984 (C.D. CaL 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct.
735 (1982).
18. 102 S. Ct. at 739-40.
19. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
20. 102 S. Ct. at 743.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 740.
23. 102 S. Ct. 3440 (1982).
24. The defendant's fifth amendment right in question was the right to due
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with illegal transportation of aliens.25 The Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit's application of the "conceivable benefit" test which
required that deportable illegal aliens be available to the defendant whenever they are eyewitnesses or active participants to the
crime.2 6
Valenzuela-Bernal was apprehended after failing to stop at a
Border Patrol checkpoint. Three of his five passengers were arrested along with Valenzuela-Bernal. 27 The three passengers admitted illegal entry and identified Valenzuela-Bernal as the driver
of the car. "An Assistant United States Attorney concluded that
the passengers possessed no evidence material to the prosecution
or defense" 28 and thus two of the passengers were deported. The
third passenger was detained to enable the government to provide a non-hearsay basis for the violation of section 274(a) (2) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Valenzuela-Bernal was denied the opportunity of interviewing
the deported aliens to determine whether they had evidence that
could assist his defense. The Court held that the defendant must
make a showing of how the absent testimony would have been
both material and favorable to his defense.29 Only after some
plausible explanation would the lower court have to entertain
claims of fifth or sixth amendment right violations.
The Court justified its decision by the effectiveness prompt deportation had on curbing the constant flow of illegal aliens into
the United States. 30 The budgetary limitations and lack of adeprocess, while the sixth amendment right was the right to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses.
25. Immigration and Nationality Act § 274(a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2) (1976).

This section makes it a crime for "any person who transports, or moves, or attempts to transport or move, any alien knowing that [the alien] is in the United
States in violation of law, and knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe
that his last entry into the United States occurred less than three years prior
... ." Id.
26. 647 F.2d 72, 75 (9th Cir. 1981), rev.d, 102 S. Ct 2382 (1982). For a discussion
of possible applications of the "conceivable benefit" test, see 102 S. Ct at 3444.
27. The remaining two passengers fled on foot and were not apprehended. 102
S. Ct at 3443.
28. 102 S. Ct. at 3442.

29. Id. at 3450. The Court relaxed the speciflcity required when showing materiality because of the unique situation of not being able to interview the potential
witness. Id. at 3452.
30. Id. at 3445. The majority of the illegal aliens apprehended are offered voluntary departure. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)
(1976), as amended by Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub.

L. No. 97-116, 95 Stat 1611, 1620.

quate detention facilities were cited as support for the government's determination of the value of the alien's testimony.
Consequently, the alien needs to be more than a mere eyewitness
or participant to the crime to overcome the congressional policy
of prompt deportation. 3 '
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE V. THE WASHINGTON POST
COMPANY

The Court unanimously upheld the State Department's refusal
to disclose citizenship information to a newspaper in United
32
States Department of State v. The Washington Post Company.
The Washington Post had requested information under the Freedom of Information Act 33 (FOIA) regarding the citizenship of two
Iranians who were prominent figures in Iran's revolutionary government. The Court supported the State Department's denial of
the request on the ground that the information was protected
from disclosure under the sixth exemption of the FOIA. This exemption provides that the Act's disclosure requirements do not
apply to "personnel and medical files and similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy."3 4
The Court concluded that it was Congress' intent to assign a
broad meaning to "similar files" in order to "protect individuals
from the injury and embarrassment that can result from unnecessary disclosure of personal information."3 5 The Court found that
the information sought by the Washington Post satisfied the simi38
lar files requirement.
SUMITOMO SHOJI AMERICA, INC. V. A VAGLIANO

In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano,3 7 the Court held
that a treaty between the United States and Japan 3 8 enabling
31. There are variations in the materiality test of the witness. Recently, the
Sixth Circuit decided in the defendant's favor in United States v. Armijo-Martinez,

669 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1982). The court of appeals did require a minimal showing
of prejudice to defendant's defense caused by the illegal aliens' deportation. See
United States v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1982).
32. 102 S. Ct. 1957 (1982).

33. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).

34. Id. § 552(b)(6).
35. 102 S. Ct. at 1959.
36. The Court remanded to allow the court of appeals to balance the private
interest against the public interest and to consider whether release of this information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
37. 102 S.Ct. 2374 (1982).
38. Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-

Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.IAS. No. 2863.
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companies from either country to hire executive employees of
their choice3 9 does not exempt Japanese companies doing business in the United States from title Vii's ban on discrimination
relating to sex and national origin. The Court found Sumitomo's

alleged practice of hiring only male Japanese citizens violated title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.40
In reversing the holding of the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court adhered to the literal language of the treaty.4 1 The Court
found that under the treaty, local subsidiaries of the foreign company were companies of the country in which they are incorporated and were thereby regulated under the rights and
responsibilities applying to other domestic companies. 42
CertiorariDenied
The Court refused to grant certiorari in several notable cases in
the immigration area. In seven cases the Court denied review of
alleged constitutional and statutory violations. 43 The Court also
39. Id. at art. VIH (1), 4 U.S.T. 2070.
40. 102 S. Ct. 2376, 2382.
41. Article XXII (3) of the treaty provides: "the term 'companies' means corporations.. ." and "companies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either Party shall be deemed companies thereof
." Treaty, supra note 38, at art. XXII, 4 U.S.T. 2079-80.
42. 102 S. Ct. at 2381.
43. The Court refused to review due process violations alleged by the alien
plaintiff in Knoetze v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 109 (1982). Plaintiff's nonimmigrant
visa had been revoked without notice due to his prior convictions involving moral
turpitude.
The Court also declined to review plaintiff's due process claims in Roberts v.
United States, 102 S. Ct. 568 (1981); Morgan v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 568 (1981);
and Zavala Pizano v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 568 (1981). Plaintiffs appealed their
convictions for transporting illegal aliens because potential alien witnesses were
returned to Mexico prior to the plaintiffs being charged with the offense. These
cases are related to United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 102 S. Ct. 3440 (1982). See
supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
The Court refused to hear petitioner's fourth amendment claims in Petty v.
United States, 102 S. Ct. 360 (1981). Petitioner based his appeal on the fact that
evidence against him was obtained by border patrol agents who searched his car
without the probable cause necessary to-justify his detention.
The Court did not review the decision in Blackie's House of Beef v. Castillo, 102
S. Ct. 1432 (1982). For a discussion of the case, see infra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
In Eain v. Wilkes, 102 S. Ct. 390 (1982), a denial of habeas corpus stood despite a
defense of "political offense" in a proceeding for extradition of an alleged member
of the Palestine Liberation Organization to Israel, where he was convicted of a violent crime.

refused to reconsider five decisions regarding deportation."
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

When an alien is prosecuted for illegal entry, one of the defenses that may be presented is an attack on the original deportation order. Currently the circuits are sharply divided on how to
treat such a collateral attack. Lacking guidance from the
Supreme Court,4 5 the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits allow
collateral attacks while the Second, Fifth, and Tenth do not.4 6
In United States v. De La Cruz-Sepulveda,47 the Fifth Circuit
joined the Second and Tenth Circuits ruling that a deportation order cannot be attacked in a prosecution for violation of section 276
of the Immigration and Nationality Act.48 The alien defendant
plead nolo contendere to a charge of marijuana possession and
was deported in 1974.49 He was found in the United States in 1980
and charged with being unlawfully in the United States after having been deported. Defendant argued that his original deportation order was improperly based on a criminal conviction that was
not final. The court held that in prosecution of an alien for unlawful reentry under section 276 of the Act, he may not collaterally
44. In Alvarez-Romero v. INS, 102 S. Ct. 675 (1981), the Court refused to review
the finding that petitioner was deportable and ineligible for discretionary relief because of an inability to show good moral character following a conviction for heroin distribution.
The Court upheld the ruling in INS v. Tejeda-Mata, 102 S. Ct. 2280 (1982), which
found that although an immigration judge abused his discretion by refusing to permit simultaneous translation of testimony, the error was harmless because the
testimony only confirmed the alien's own admission of alienage.
In Chiravachardhikul v. INS, 102 S. Ct. 389 (1981), the Court did not review the
rule that to qualify for discretionary relief from exclusion under § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, an alien must accumulate the seven-year period of
unrelinquished lawful domicile after procuring permanent resident status.
The Court refused to reconsider the petitioner's conviction which was based on
a nolo contendere plea in Bucio-Reyes v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 478 (1981), to a
charge of unlawful reentry following deportation despite the fact that petitioner
thought he was innocent.
The Court also declined to review a denial of a Federal Tort Claims Act claim by
county officials who incurred the expense of providing health care to illegal aliens.
In San Diego County v. Nelson, 102 S. Ct. 1713 (1982), local officials alleged damages due to the failure of the United States government to properly perform its
duties in preventing the entry of aliens into the United States.
45. In United States v. Specter, 343 U.S. 169 (1952), the Supreme Court did not
rule on whether judicial review of an administrative order of deportation is constitutionally mandated when a criminal trial is based upon that order.
46. For specific cites for each circuit see United States v. De La CruzSepulveda, 656 F.2d 1129, 1132 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981).
47. 656 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1981).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1976). This section prohibits unauthorized reentry after
deportation.
49. 656 F.2d at 1130.
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attack the original deportation order.50
In Garcia-Trigo v. United States,5 1 the Fifth Circuit ruled that
lack of notification to the defendant of deportation consequences
of his guilty plea did not entitle him to collaterally attack his
criminal conviction. Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident,
plead guilty and served his sentence for the petty offense of "unlawfully entering the United States by wading the river."5 2 Only
after pleading guilty did he learn that this subjected him to deportation. Garcia-Trigo sought to vacate his conviction through a writ
of error coram nobis 53 contending that he was not informed of the
nature of his offense and the consequences of his guilty plea.
The court found no exceptional circumstances to justify using
the writ of error. There was no evidence that Garcia-Trigo's rights
were fundamentally violated in the prior proceedings. The court
held that the potential results of his guilty plea upon his immigration status was a "collateral consequence" that did not necessitate an explanation to defendant at the prior trial.54
In United States v. Arambula-Alvarado,55 the Ninth Circuit reduced a conviction of illegal entry under section 275 of the Act
from a felony to a misdemeanor. The defendant contested the felony conviction under section 275, which provides that the first violations are misdemeanors, while subsequent commissions are
felonies. The court found ambiguity in the word "commissions,"
and read the statute narrowly to favor the accused.5 6 Since the
government did not prove there was a prior violation of section
275, the court remanded the felony conviction for redetermination
as a misdemeanor.
50. Id. at 1131.
51. 671 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1982).
52. Id. at 148.

53. "The common law writ of error coram nobis is [used] to correct errors of
fact of such fundamental character as to render the proceeding itself irregular and
invalid." See United States v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 565, 590 n.14 (9th Cir. 1981). The
function of writ of error coram nobis is to allow a court to review its own judgment
because of an alleged fact which did not appear on the face of the record. See 28
U.S.C. § 1651 (1976).
54. 671 F.2d at 150.
55. 677 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1982).
56. Id. at 52.

ESTOPPEL
In Miranda v. INS,57 the Ninth Circuit held that the INS' unex-

plained eighteen-month delay in acting on a visa petition constituted affirmative misconduct warranting estoppel against the
government. The Supreme Court had vacated 58 the Ninth Circuit's previous decision which granted estoppe 59 and remanded
the ruling for further consideration in light of its companiori case,
Schweiker v. Hansen.60
Petitioner Miranda filed an application for adjustment of status
and his wife, a United States citizen, filed an immediate relative
visa petition on his behalf. During the following eighteen months
in which the INS failed to act, petitioner's marriage was dissolved
and his wife withdrew the visa petition. Two days later Miranda's
adjustment application was denied, and he was found deportable
by the immigration judge. The BIA found no evidence of aff-mative misconduct by the INS. It dismissed petitioner's argument
that the INS was estopped from denying the availability of a visa
because of the INS' unexplained delay. The Ninth Circuit reversed, applying estoppel against the NS.61
Upon reconsideration in light of Hansen, the Ninth Circuit adhered to its original opinion, distinguishing Hansen on three significant grounds. First, in Hansen misinformation claimant
received from the government resulted in her failure to apply for
Social Security benefits to which she was eligible. 62 In Miranda,
however, the petitioner was not seeking benefit payments.63 Second, the Hansen court found no "affirmative misconduct" by government agents,64 whereas Miranda was decided upon the
existence of just such action.65 Third, the court in Hansen also
held that the petitioner had not sustained irrevocable damage
from her reliance on the government's actions.6 6 The Ninth Circuit found that the INS' conduct had inflicted irreparable harm on
Miranda. 67
57. 673 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1982).
58. INS v. Miranda, 102 S. Ct. 81 (1981).
59. 638 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1980), vacated, 102 S. Ct 81 (1981).
60. 450 U.S. 785 (1981). In Hansen,the Supreme Court declined to apply estoppel against the government while failing to establish general guidelines for application of the doctrine.
61. 638 F.2d at 84.
62. 450 U.S. at 786. The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision
to estop the government from denying her benefits for the period during which
she should have received payments.
63. 673 F.2d at 1106.
64. 450 U.S. at 788-89.
65. 638 F.2d at 84.
66. 450 U.S. at 789.
67. 673 F.2d at 1106.
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The case was "remanded for consideration of Miranda's application for permanent resident status under the same conditions that
within a reasonable time"
would have existed had the INS 6acted
8
following his original application.
In Akbarin v. INS,69 the First Circuit held that an immigration
judge denied petitioner a fair hearing by failing to admit evidence
of the alien's estoppel defense and committed an error of law by
holding that evidence to be irrelevant. Akbarin entered the
United States as a nonimmigrant student and accepted part-time
employment without obtaining official INS employment authorization. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, section
101(a) (15) (F) (1), a nonimmigrant student is not permitted to engage in off-campus employment unless he has specific authorization from the INS under section 214.2(f) (6).70
Akbarin claimed that prior to accepting employment, his prospective employer telephoned the INS to determine if petitioner
was eligible to work. An unidentified INS official informed the
employer that petitioner was authorized for part-time employment and that petitioner could begin work.71 Petitioner claimed
that in reliance on that conversation he accepted the job.
At Akbarin's deportation hearing, the immigration judge declared petitioner deportable and refused to allow him to testify as
to the alleged telephone conversation. The judge found this evidence irrelevant as petitioner "could have obtained authorization
for employment by submitting a form 1-538 to the INS."72 The
BIA upheld the immigration judge's decision.
The First Circuit held that an estoppel claim must satisfy two
elements: first, the government must commit an error which
could reasonably be intended to, and did, induce reliance; and
second, the government's misconduct must induce petitioner to
undertake actions in which he would not otherwise engage.7 3 The
68. Id.
69. 669 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1982).
70. Id. at 840. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f) (6) (v) does not permit employment in this situation unless "the student has submitted [form 1-538] to an authorized official of a
and this form has been certified by
school approved by the Attorney General ....
that official that all the... requirments [of this section] have been met.... The
student has permission to accept employment when he/she receives the form...
enclosed by the Service to that effect."
71. 669 F.2d at 841.
72. Id.
73. Id at 843.

court concluded that it was error to exclude evidence that might
estop the government from claiming violations of employment restrictions.7 4 The court also found no compelling reasons to preclude estoppel. Such a ruling would not interfere with
implementation of immigration employment regulations because
they serve principally administrative purposes. Without making a
final ruling on the validity of Akbarin's estoppel claim, the court
vacated the deportation order and remanded to allow him to pres75
ent his evidence.
The Ninth Circuit applied collateral estoppel against the government in Mendoza v. United States.76 It affirmed the district
court's grant of naturalization to a seventy-three-year-old Filipino
World War II veteran of the United States armed forces under the
then expired Nationality Act of 1940.77

The court held that the

government was estopped by a decision on the same issues in
Matter of Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans7 8 which
granted naturalization to Filipino veterans under the expired Act.
Matter of Naturalizationof 68 Filipino War Veterans held that
the government's withdrawal of its naturalization examiner from
the Philippines had deprived veterans, similar to Mendoza, of
their due process rights under the equal protection component of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The Ninth Circuit
found no circumstances that warranted relitigation of these issues
79
decided against the government.
The court noted the conflicting decision of the Second Circuit in
Olegario v. United StatessO which rejected the contention that the
68 Filipino War Veterans judgment bound the government by collateral estoppel in other cases. The Ninth Circuit was unpersuaded by the Second Circuit's ruling that applying collateral
estoppel in these cases violated the guidelines of fairness to the
defendant established by Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.81 The
Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in applying collateral
74. Id. at 844.

75. Id. at 845.
76. 672 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982).

77. In 1942 Congress amended the Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137
to provide for naturalization of noncitizens who served honorably in the armed
forces. See Second War Powers Act of 1942, ch. 199, 56 Stat. 176. However, due to
international concerns, the United States failed to provide INS naturalization officials in the Philippines from 1945 to 1946 to implement the Act.
78. 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
79. 672 F.2d at 1329.
80. 629 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1980).
81. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). In ParklaneHosiery, the Supreme Court observed that
offensive collateral estoppel may be unfair to the defendant if one or more of the
following situations is present1. if there is little incentive to defend the first suit vigorously because
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estoppel against the government's denial of naturalization to
82
Mendoza.
In the Matter of M/V "Solemn Judge,"8 3 the BIA ruled on the
"affirmative misconduct" standard for collateral estoppel left undefined by the Supreme Court in Schweiker v. Hansen.84 The vessel "Solemn Judge" was fined $190,000 for bringing one hundred
ninety-one Cuban nationals without visas to the United States in
violation of sections 273(a) and (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. These provisions impose fines for transportation of
aliens unless the carrier did not know, and could not have reasonably ascertained that the individuals transported were without
visas.
The BIA rejected all claims of "affirmative misconduct" alleged
by the carrier in order to estop the government from imposing
these fines. The BIA ruled that nothing in the statements of government personnel could reasonably have been construed as
waiving visa requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act
or as authorizing the carrier to bring undocumented aliens to the
United States. Nor did the United States Coast Guard or Customs Service have a legal duty to warn the carrier of potential
fines. 8 5 Since "affirmative misconduct" had not been established,

the BIA declined to decide whether estoppel could be applied
against the government in this case or whether the BIA has the
authority to implement the estoppel doctrine.86
DEPORTATION PROCEDURE

Several significant cases were decided which further define the
procedural aspects of deportation especially regarding abuse of
either the damages sought are nominal or there are no foreseeable fu-

ture suits;
2. if there are inconsistent judgments involving the defendant or
3. if there are procedural opportunities available in the second suit,
which were unavailable in the prior action.
Id. at 330-31.
82. 672 F.2d at 1330.
83. L &N. Dec. 2894 (1982).
84. 450 U.S. 785 (1981). See supra note 60 and accompanying text. The BIA
noted two nationality cases, INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973), and Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961), which stood for the possibility that estoppel could be applied against the government where affirmative misconduct by its agents is

established.
85. L &N. Dec. 2894 at 6.
86. Id.

discretion by the BIA. In Reyes v. INS,87 the Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA denial of a motion to reopen suspension of deportation proceedings. 88 The BIA ruled that Reyes failed to establish
a prima facie case because it disbelieved the facts stated in the
submitted affidavits. 89 The court held that the Board should accept as true the facts presented on behalf of the petitioner during
this preliminary proceeding.
The court distinguished the recent decision in Hamid v. INS9o
in which it sustained the BIA's decision to deny a motion to reopen. In Hamid, the Ninth Circuit found the Board did not abuse
its discretion even though it denied the motion to reopen on the
ground that the facts were "inherently unbelievable." 9'
The distinction between Hamid and Reyes is the credibility of
the evidence. The evidence Reyes presented was consistent and
therefore allowed the BIA to assume truthfulness. The evidence
presented by Hamid was unsubstantiated to a degree that precluded resolution in favor of the petitioner. The Hamid decision
follows the precedent established by the United States Supreme
Court in INS v. Wang,92 which allowed the BIA broad discretion
so long as the discretion is not arbitrary, irrational or contrary to
law. 93

In Chae Kim Ro v. INS,94 the Ninth Circuit reversed a denial by
the BIA to reopen suspension of deportation proceedings when
the petitioner ified a motion based on new evidence. The court
concluded that discretionary relief should have been granted by
the Board in view of the birth of a United States citizen to the petitioner.95 The birth, which occurred after the hearing with the
immigration judge and before the BIA appeal, constituted new evidence and justified the motion to reopen.
In Sida v. INS,96 the Ninth Circuit continued to refine the dis87. 673 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1982).

88. The motion to reopen is a preliminary proceeding that is not intended to
replace a hearing but is a screening device with which the Board disposes of

claims clearly lacking merit. For a discussion of the motion to reopen, see Hurwitz, Motions PracticeBefore the Board of ImmigrationAppeals, 20 SAN DIEGO L
The function of the Board at the preliminary hearing is to
determine whether or not the alien has presented a prima facie case; not to make
a final decision based upon the merits of the evidence. 673 F.2d at 1089.
89. 673 F.2d at 1089.
90. 648 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1981).
91. Id. at 637.
92. 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
93. See 450 U.S. at 143 n.5.
94. 670 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1982).
95. Id. at 116.
96. 665 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1981). Sida is also notable because the Ninth Circuit
ruled that a one-month absence from the United States was not a meaningful inREV. 79, 81-89 (1982).

Synopsis

[VOL. 20: 191, 1982]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

cretion available to the BIA in light of new evidence favorable to
the petitioner. Basing its decision on Wang and SantanaFigueroav. INS,97 the court ruled that the alien must have the opportunity to present favorable new evidence, and is entitled to a
decision on the merits.9 8
In Balani v. INS99 the Sixth Circuit upheld a BIA denial of a
motion to reopen following a previous denial of suspension of deportation. Following Wang, the court held that administrative discretion is unassailable on judicial review absent a clear showing
of abuse by the Board.100 A motion to reopen deportation proceedings can be successful if there are circumstances that have
changed after a deportation order becomes final. Balani
presented facts already known to the immigration judge. Therefore, "the Board did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
the petitioner raised no material new facts in his motion."' 0 '
In Dastmalshiv. INS,102 the Third Circuit held that it lacked the
proper jurisdiction under section 106(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act to review the validity of INS regulations that implemented President Carter's directives following the seizure of
the American Embassy in Teheran, Iran. These Presidential directives led to final deportation orders of the Iranian petitioners.
In taking this narrow view of section 106(a) jurisdiction, the court
disagreed with Chadha v. INS,103 now being reviewed by the
Supreme Court.
SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION

Several judicial and administrative decisions considered the
procedure for suspension of deportation. These decisions are important because suspension of deportation' 0 4 is one of the most
common forms of relief for an alien faced with leaving the United
terruption of a continuous physical presence required for suspension of deportation. See infra notes 104-37 and accompanying text.
97. 644 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
98. 665 F.2d at 854.
99. 669 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1982).
100. Id. at 1161.
101. Id.
102. 660 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1981).
103. 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
104. Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976).

States. 1 05 Once an alien has established statutory eligibility, the
Attorney General has discretion to suspend deportation.10 6 After
the Attorney General has ruled in favor of the alien, congressional ratification must follow.107 In Chadha v. INS,108 the Ninth
Circuit ruled the one-house legislative veto violates the separation of powers doctrine of the Constitution. Chadha is currently
being reviewed by the Supreme Court, but a final decision was
postponed until the 1982-1983 Term.
The statutory requirements necessary for suspension of deportation mandate: one, the alien's physical presence in the United
States for a continuous period of not less than seven years; two,
the alien's good moral character and three, the resulting deportation would result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his
spouse, parent, or child who is a citizen or legal resident of the
United States. 0 9
Continuous Physical Presence
The seven-year continuous physical presence requirement must
immediately precede the alien's application for suspension of deportation. 10 The controlling word in the statute is "continuous."
In Phinpathya v. INS,"' the Ninth Circuit ruled that the proper
test when evaluating breaks in continuous presence is to view the
circumstances in their totality. Adhering to the principles developed in Rosenberg v. Fleuti" 2 and redefined in Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS,11 the court observed the Fleuti factors were
105. See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENnELD, IJmIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.9
(rev. ed. 1981).
106. Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976), as
amended by Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97116, 95 Stat. 1611, 1620.
107. Id
108. 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted,50 U.S.L.W. 3211 (U.S. October 6,
1981) (No. 80-1832).
109. Irmigration and Nationality Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976), as
amended by Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97116, 95 Stat. 1611, 1620; cf Tovar v. INS, 612 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1980). In Tovar, the
Third Circuit extended the third requirement to encompass extreme hardship to
the alien's grandchildren if they are either United States citizens or legal
residents.
110. Tovar v. INS, 612 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1980).
111. 673 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1981).
112. 374 U.S. 449 (1963). In Feuti, the Supreme Court suggested three factors
which may cause the alien's absence to be a meaningful interruption of permanent residence. The three factors are: (1) the length of absence; (2) whether the
purpose was opposed to the immigration law policy; and (3) whether travel documents had to be obtained for the trip. Id at 461-62.
113. 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979). In Kamheangpatiyooth,.the Ninth Circuit
ruled that while the Fleuti factors were relevant, the factors themselves were not
conclusive on the issue of continuous physical presence. Id. at 1257.
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evidentiary in nature and not determinative of breaks in the
alien's physical presence."14
In Phinpathya, the court emphasized that events must be
viewed in their totality and in light of the underlying congressional purpose."15 Mrs. Phinpathya was physically present in the
United States for eight years immediately preceding her application for suspension of deportation with the exception of a threemonth trip to Thailand. The purpose of the trip was to visit her
sick mother. Mrs. Phinpathya traveled with her two children
while her husband remained in the United States. She intended
to return and live permanently in the United States.
The Ninth Circuit disapproved of the strictness with which the
6 In KamheBIA applied the factors from Kamheangpatiyooth."1
angpatiyooth, the court held that an absence cannot be meaningfully interruptive if two factors are present: one, the hardships
would be as severe if the absence had not occurred; and two,
there would be no increase in the risk of deportation as a result of
the absence.". 7 The court held the BIA committed reversible error by isolating a factor and treating it as determinative of
whether the absence is meaningfully interruptive. The isolated
factor was the increased risk of deportation that Mrs. Phinpathya
faced because of her absence."18 This was sufficient ground for
remand to the BIA.
9 the Fifth Circuit ruled that it
In Men Keng Chang v. Juigni,"1
was not an abuse of discretion on the part of the BIA to consider
how the continuous physical presence requirement was satisfied.' 2 0 The applicant, who had not satisfied the seven-year requirement at the time of his initial application, disappeared after
the deportation order. Because of this evasion, the seven-year requirement was completed after the initial deportation proceeding
but prior to a subsequent application for suspension of deportation. The court followed Faddahv. INS121 which established that
evasion of deportation to achieve the seven-year period was a
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

673 F.2d at 1017.
Id.
Id. at 1018.
597 F.2d at 1257.
673 F.2d at 1018.
669 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 278.
553 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977).

proper factor for BIA consideration.12 2
Good Moral Character
In addition to clarifying the Ninth Circuit's stand on continuous
physical presence, the Phinpathya court also ruled that the BIA
had erred when concluding Mrs. Phinpathya was not of good
moral character because she allegedly gave false statements in order to obtain a visa to return to the United States.123 The court
considered whether statements made to the American consulate
in Bangkok constituted testimony that could jeopardize the statutory good moral character requirement.124 The court believed
the evalthat had Congress intended all statements to be used in
25
uation, it would have changed the statutory language.1
In Okabe v. INS,126 the Fifth Circuit held that offering a bribe to
an immigration officer is a crime involving moral turpitude. In upholding the deportation order, the court noted that "whether a
crime involves moral turpitude depends upon the inherent nature
of the crime, as defined by the statute, rather than the circumstances [of the alien's] particular transgression."127 Because
under the statute "a corrupt mind is an essential element of the
offense,"' 2 8 the immigration judge was correct in evaluating
Okabe's moral character in light of his bribery conviction.
Following the enactment of Immigration and Nationality Act
Amendments of 1981,129 which repeal adultery as a mandatory bar

to good moral character, the INS issued instructions to field offices that "the service will continue to recommend denial of petitions for naturalization when the adultery practiced has adverse
30
public effects."1
122. Id. at 496.
123. 673 F.2d at 1018.
124. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(f) (6), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (6) (1976).
In this section the word "testimony" is used when evaluating falsifications made
in an effort to obtain the benefits of suspension of deportation.
125. 673 F.2d at 1019.

126. 671 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1982).
127. Id. at 865.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976). Under this section one is guilty of bribery of a
public official whenever one "directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers, or
promises anything of value... with the intent to... induce such public official
"
...to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty ....
129. See infra notes 270-75 and accompanying text.
130. 59 INTERPRETER RELEASES 4-5 (1982). Adverse public effects result when
the adultery breaks up an existing marriage, involves minors, is incestuous in nature, involves fraud or the taking of money, and where it is considered open and
notorious.
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Extreme Hardship
In Phinpathya,the Ninth Circuit also discussed the third factor
in suspension of deportation: extreme hardship. The BIA had rejected Phinpathya's claim that his deportation would cause extreme hardship to his epileptic child. The court reversed the BIA
because the BIA concentrated on whether there was adequate
medical care available in Thailand but did not consider the hardship that travel and uprooting would impose on the child.'3' The
BIA's failure to consider any hardship beyond the lack of proof
regarding available medical services was an abuse of discretion
13 2
and the court remanded the case for reconsideration.
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's opinion in INS
v. Wang' 33 that the BIA has broad discretion in determining what
constitutes extreme hardship. In He Yung Ahn v. INS,34 the
Ninth Circuit sustained the BIA denial of suspension of deportation even though the alien argued the BIA had committed procedural errors in an attempt to evade Wang. The importance of He
Yung Ahn is the extent to which the Ninth Circuit is willing to
allow the BIA to define extreme hardship. In He Yung Ahn, the
BIA refused to consider Mr. Ahn's claims that his political acts
35
would cause him extreme hardship if returned to his homeland.
Exercising the latitude provided by Wang, the BIA denied the
alien's appeal, holding it inappropriate to consider political claims
under extreme hardship.
In the Matter of Cabral,3 6 the BIA ruled that extreme hardship
does not have a fixed meaning but is dependent on the facts and
circumstances of each individual case. A history of violations of
immigration laws does not necessarily preclude the reopening of
deportation proceedings where a prima facie showing of extreme
hardship is established. The Board held that the respondent
should have the chance to develop his case fully before an immi3 7
gration judge and is entitled to receive a decision on the merits.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

673 F.2d at 1016.
Id. at 1016-17.
450 U.S. 139 (1981).
651 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1288.
Matter of Cabral, A21 327 982, A23 076 872, A23 076 874 (BIA October 8,

1981).

137. Id.

ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS

The Attorney General has the sole discretion to adjust the status of a temporary nonimrnmigrant to a permanent resident of the
United States. 138 The alien must apply for adjustment, be eligible
for the change under the immigration laws, and have an immigrant visa available at the time of the application.139 Adjustment
of status does not waive the Attorney General's ability to deport
the alien, if applicable, due to changing factors within five years of
0
status adjustment.14
In Matter of Onal,141 the BIA mandated rescission of an alien's
adjustment of status to a nonpreference immigrant when the Department of Labor invalidated the labor certification upon which
adjustment was based. The Board also ruled that since the INS
"instituted proceedings against the respondent within the
statutory five-year period'4 2 after his adjustment of status occurred, the INS' subsequent delay in holding the rescission hearing was not shown to be unreasonable or prejudicial." 4 3 Nor
could the respondent invoke the doctrine of estoppel by laches for
this type of delay.
Respondent originally entered the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor who obtained a labor certification for employment as
a foreign food specialty cook. Upon this certification, his status
was adjusted to lawful permanent resident as a nonpreference
immigrant.'" Five months later, however, the Department of Labor notified the INS that respondent worked as a dishwasher
rather than as a specialty cook. Based on respondent's material
misrepresentations, the Department of Labor found him ineligible
and invalidated his labor certificate.145
The Board found that since respondent had been ineligible for
the labor certificate at the time it was originally granted, the certification had no effect at any time. Consequently, the entire basis
upon which respondent's status adjustment was granted did not
exist, and he was never eligible for the adjustment. Section 246 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act mandates rescission of an
adjustment of status granted under these circumstances. 48
138. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976).
139. Id. In practice, most aliens claim exempt status as immediate relatives of
American citizens, usually by marriage. This avoids the preference categories.
140. Immigration and Nationality Act § 246(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (1976).
141. I. & N. Dec. 2886 (1981).
142. Immigration and Nationality Act § 246(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (1976).
143. I. & N. Dec. 2886 at 2.
144. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(b) (1976).
145. I. &N. Dec. 2886 at 4.
146. Id.
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Although the rescission hearing took place three years after
service of the notice of intent to rescind, the Board found no evidence to support preclusion of rescission under the affirmative
defense of estoppel by laches. Respondent did not show that he
was prejudiced, misled or changed his position in any way due to
the delay in commencing proceedings.
The Board noted that "laches only protects against prejudice
caused by unreasonable delay in bringing an action, not against
problems created by the pendency of the action after it is instituted."147 Proceedings against the respondent were initiated well
within the statutory five-year period following grant of adjustment. Nor did the Board find that the mere inaction of not going
forward with the hearing amounted to the "affirmative misconduct" by the government required to invoke estoppel. 4 8
ENTRY AND ExcLusIoN
In Garcia v. Smith,149 the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Garcia arrived in the United States as a stowaway and,
due to the situation in his homeland of Cuba, immediately applied for political asylum. The INS denied his request and began
deportation proceedings.150 The district court granted a temporary restraining order barring deportation, but later found a lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and dissolved the order.151
The Eleventh Circuit held that while the district court relied
upon section 273(d) of the Act to deny Garcia a hearing, Congress
clearly intends that stowaways be entitled to apply for asylum.152
The court concluded that, irrespective of petitioner's request for
review of the INS denial under the stowaway provision of the law,
there remained jurisdiction over Garcia's petition for asylum.153
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 57-86 and accompanying text.

149. 674 F.2d 838 (11th Cir. 1982).
150. Id. at 839.

151. Id. The district court relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1323(d) (1976) in ruling it lacked
subject matter jurisdictioi. The court strictly applied the language of the statute
which states "that stowaways will be excluded from the United States with
neither the hearing nor the right to appeal that... usually are available to individuals seeking entry into this country." 674 F.2d at 839. This statute was considered, on its face, to deny subject matter jurisdiction to the court.
152. 674 F.2d at 840. See S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980).
153. 674 F.2d at 840. In addition to the asylum issue, the Eleventh Circuit em-

In Palma v. Verdeyen,15 4 the Fourth Circuit held that the Attorney General has the inherent power to detain an excluded alien
indefinitely if the alien cannot be returned to his own country and
the circumstances do not warrant a grant of parole. 55 The petitioner relied on the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Rodriquez-Fernandez
v. Wilkinson56 in which a similarly situated alien was found suitable for parole by the Attorney General.157 The Fourth Circuit
distinguished Palma because there had been an individual determination showing deportation was proper. Therefore, while immediate deportation was impracticable, there had been a finding
that Palma was not suitable for parole.158
In Firestone v. Howerton,15 9 the Ninth Circuit held that former
membership in the Communist Party, a proscribed organization,
cannot render an alien inadmissible without additional factors. 60
The petitioner argued that a meaningful association standard
should be applied in evaluating admission of aliens just as that
standard had been codified for deportation cases.161 The petitioner's deportation proceedings were dismissed in 1964 when he
was found not to be a meaningful member of the Communist
Party. The court agreed with the petitioner that congressional intent allowed the meaningful association standard to be applied to
exclusion proceedings as well as deportation hearings. 62
In the Matter of Carl Hill,163 the United States District Court
ruled that a self-admitted homosexual can be excluded from the
United States only when the exclusion is based upon a class "A"
certification from the Public Health Service. 6 4
EMPLOYMENT

Nonimmigrant aliens may change their status to lawfully admitted permanent residents under section 245 of the Immigration and
phasized that the Supreme Court has never questioned the availability of a peti-

tion for habeas corpus even with the limited nature of the rights due illegal aliens.

Id.
154. 676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1982).
155. Id. at 104.
156. 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
157. 676 F.2d at 104-05. Petitioners in both cases had been imprisoned in Cuba
for theft when they were allowed to join the Freedom Flotilla to the United States.
158. 676 F.2d at 105.
159. 671 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1982).
160. Id. at 321.
161. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a) (28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (28) (1976).
162. 671 F.2d at 320.
163. Matter of Carl Hill, No. C-81-4055 RPA (N.D. CaL Apr. 22, 1982).
164. Id.; see Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (4)
(1976).
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Nationality Act.165 However, the Act's unauthorized employment
provision 66 specifically bars applicants, other than immediate relatives or certain medical doctors, from adjusting their status if
they accept unauthorized employment prior to filing an
application.
In Bhakta v. INS,167 the Ninth Circuit held that although an
alien is denied investor status by the INS if he acts more as an
investor than as a laborer, his business activities do not constitute
68
unauthorized employment within the meaning of section 245 (c)1
to bar adjustment of eligibility. Without concluding whether
Bhakta's enterprise satisfied the nonpreference investor regulation,16 9 the court compared the petitioner to an investor entrepreneur. His owning and operating a motel did not "adversely affect
employment opportunities for legitimate aspirants in the labor
pool" and therefore did not cause the harm section 245(c) seeks
0
to prevent.17
In Johnson-Laird,Inc. v. INS,""I the United States district court
considered whether section 101(a) (15) (L) of the Act allows a sole
proprietorship to request nonimmigrant status for employees
transferred to positions in the United States.
Petitioner founded a business in Canada and opened a branch
in Oregon. He entered the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor and listed himself as an employee of his sole proprietorship in
his application for classification as an intracompany transferee.
The INS denied his petition, which under section 101 (a) (15) (L)
would grant him a three-year renewable stay. The INS held that
because a sole proprietorship lacked a separate legal existence,
petitioner was not employed by a business eligible to make such
165. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976). The procedure for changing status is outlined supra
in the text accompanying notes 138-48.
166. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (1976). 'The
an alien... who hereafter
provisions of this section shall not be applicable to...

continues in or accepts unauthorized employment prior to filing an adjustment of
status... ." Id.
167. 667 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1982).
168. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (1976), amended by Immigration and Nationality Act
Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, 95 Stat. 1611, 1614.
169. 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b) (4) (1977). The regulation outlines the requirements an
alien must meet to avoid obtaining labor certification. The main requirement is in-

vesting $40,000 in an enterprise of which the alien will be the principal manager.
Id.
170. 667 F.2d at 773.
171. 537 F. Supp. 52 (D. Or. 1981).

transfers. 7 2
The district court reversed, finding the INS interpretation to be
inconsistent with the language and purpose of the statute. Legislative history indicated an anticipation "that the words Trn' and
'legal entity' [would] be interpreted in the broad sense to include
all bona fide forms of business organizations including partnerships, sole proprietorships and labor organizations."T 3 The court
concluded that "Congress intended that the legal status of the petitioning business not be a dispositive consideration in immigration proceedings."174
In Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts v.
Coomey,175 the First Circuit concluded that while it was the responsibility of the Department of Labor to determine "the availability of suitable American workers for the job and the impact of
alien employment upon the domestic labor market," the INS had
the authority to determine the qualifications of an alien for the
visa preference status sought.176
Barbara Zadroga entered the United States as a nonimmigrant
visitor and began unauthorized employment for Stewart InfraRed, which later submitted an application for labor certification
on her behalf. After certification was granted, Stewart Infra-Red
filed a petition with the INS for sixth preference177 visa status for
Zadroga. The INS denied the petition on the ground that Zadroga
lacked the necessary experience. The district court vacated the
INS decision, holding that the INS exceeded its discretionary authority because Congress had committed the question of qualification to the Secretary of Labor. 7 8
The First Circuit reversed, finding statutory authority for INS
determinations of eligibility,179 with the Secretary of Labor providing advisory opinions concerning the qualifications of the ben-.
eficiary.18 0 The case was remanded to determine whether
172. Id. at 53..
173. Id. at 54.
174. Id.
175. 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).
176. Id. at 6.
177. Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(a) (6), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (6) (Supp.
IV 1980). The sixth preference is available to "qualified immigrants who are capable of performing specified skilled or unskilled labor... for which a shortage of
employable and willing persons exists in the United States." Id.
178. 661 F.2d at 2.
179. Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(a) (6), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a) (6) (Supp.
IV 1980). Section 1154(b) grants the authority to the Attorney General to "determine if the facts stated in the petition are true... ." 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (1976).
180. Immigration and Nationality Act § 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (1976). This
section allows the Secretary of Labor to consult with the Attorney General after
an investigation of the facts.
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"sufficient evidence [existed] to support the INS' determination
that Zadroga was unqualified for the position for which she
sought sixth preference visa status."' 8 '
In NationalLabor Relations Board v. Sure-Tan, Inc.,182 the Seventh Circuit held that illegal aliens who lost their jobs and left the
United States as a result of unfair labor practices by their employers were entitled to reinstatement if they were legally present when they sought relief. 83 They would be entitled to back
pay only if they had been lawfully available for employment in
the United States prior to the offers of reinstatement.
The National Labor Relations Board found Sure-Tan had violated section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act'8 4 by
constructively discharging five of its employees for union activities. Following certification of a union in the business, Sure-Tan
notified the INS that it employed illegal aliens. The aliens were
then arrested and granted voluntary departure.
The court found that conventional remedies of back pay and reinstatement did not contravene immigration laws, as it is
unlikely that [an illegal worker] would attempt to illegally enter the
United States primarily to pursue his remedies and thus draw attention to
his illegal alien status .... It would be anomalous [to provide illegal
alien workers] the rights of employees under the Act, but then, when violations occur, to deny them sure rights by refusing effective remedies.185

In Petersonv. Neme, 88 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
illegal aliens working without authorization from the INS have
standing to sue for lost wages as an element of tort damages.
Plaintiff, a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure who overstayed,
missed two hundred and thirty days of her unauthorized employment as a housekeeper when she was struck by defendant's car.
The court believed that the damage award did not violate immigration policy because allowing a claim for lost wages would
hardly encourage other illegal aliens to seek employment in the
181. 661 F.2d at 6.
182. 672 F.2d 592 (7th Cir.), petitionfor reh'g denied, 677 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1982).
Sure-Tan was originally litigated to determine whether illegal aliens were "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act. See 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978).
183. 672 F.2d at 605.
184. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1976). This section states that it "shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization." Id
185. 672 F.2d at 604.
186. 222 Va. 477, 281 S.E.2d 869 (1981).

United States.1 87
In Matter of Frigon,8 8 the INS Central Office added a significant new element to the test for granting H-3 alien trainee classification. By regulation,18 9 the trainee is not permitted to undertake
productive employment if doing so would preclude a United
States resident from working.
The potential beneficiary of the H-3 classification in Mtztter of
Frigon was a trainee on an oil rig driller who spent only five percent of his time in classes, received substantial pay, and was unaccompanied by any United States workers. The Commissioner
found the alien was involved in productive employment and prescribed a balancing test to determine eligibility for the H-3 classification: "The effect of productive employment upon United
States workers should be balanced with employer's need or purpose in training the alien beneficiary."190 Classification would be
denied when alien workers pose a potential threat to jobs available to United States workers at both entry and advanced levels.
In the Matter of Crystal Shamrock, Inc.,191 an administrative
law judge took issue with the long-standing view of the "business
necessity" required for labor certification.192 While not specifically defined by statute, it was defined in Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc.,193 which held that an employee must be of
such importance to the business that without him the essence of
the business would be undermined. The court in Crystal Shamrock observed that Diaz's narrow reading of "business necessity"
resulted from its focus on the Civil Rights Act under which it was
decided.19 4
The Crystal Shamrock court rejected the view that business necessity is to be as restricted under the Immigration and Nationality Act as it was under the Civil Rights Act. In determining the
business necessity of Crystal Shamrock's requirement that its
flight instructors speak Swedish and Finnish, the court adopted
95
the business necessity test established in Ratnayake v. Mack.1
Under this rule, job requirements of an employer need only be
shown to be reasonable and tending to contribute to the quality of
187. Id. at 480, 281 S.E.2d at 872.
188. L &N. Dec. 2888 (1981).

189. 8 C.F.R. § 214(h) (4) (1976). "A trainee shall not be permitted to engage in
productive employment if such employment will displace a United States resident." Id,
190. L & N. Dec. 2888 (1981).

191. 3 ILCR (MB) 1-347, 1-350 (JuL 20, 1982).
192. 20 C.F.R. § 656.21(b) (2) (1981).
193. 311 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1972).
194. 3 ILCR at 1-352.

195. 499 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1974).
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its business. The Crystal Shamrock language requirement was
justified because it improved the efficiency of flight instruction
and cultivated a market of Scandinavian students.196
NATURALIZATION
In United States v. Dercacz,19 7 the United States district court
revoked Dercacz's citizenship by granting the government's motion for summary judgment. Dercacz entered the United States
under the Displaced Persons Act (DPA).198 He procured citizenship based on a naturalization petition in which he stated he had
never committed a crime involving moral turpitude. He had, however, persecuted Jews in his homeland. 99
The court concluded that Dercacz had illegally obtained naturalization based on section 2 of the DPA, which makes aliens who
aid the enemy in persecution of civilians ineligible for admission
to this country.20 0 The court found no triable issues existed regarding Dercacz's inability to qualify for a displaced person visa
because of the exemption of section 2 of the DPA. The court concluded the defendant illegally entered the United States because
he did not possess the required "valid unexpired immigrant
visa."201 Dercacz's later naturalization had to be revoked as Megally obtained 20 2 pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality
Act's requirement that an alien be lawfully admitted for permanent residence five years prior to applying for naturalization. 203
The court further found the defendant ineligible for a visa
under section 10 of the DPA, which precludes granting visas to
persons who wilfully misrepresent their past to enter the United
States. 204 The court concluded defendant's misrepresentations
were material under the Supreme Court standard established in
Fedorenko v. United States,20 5 which classifies facts as material
when their disclosure would result in visa ineligibility.206
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

3 ILCR at 1-353.
530 F. Supp. 1348 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
Ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
530 F. Supp. at 1351.
Id.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 211(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (1976).
Id. § 340(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).
Id. § 316(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1).
530 F. Supp. at 1351.
449 U.S. 490 (1981).
530 F. Supp. at 1352. The INS amended the naturalization regulations of 8

BENEFITS

The trend of recent regulations has been to restrict aliens' eligibility for public benefits. A Social Security Administration regulation, effective October 1, 1981, complies with provisions of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981.207

This regulation

limits eligibility of applicants for Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) to United States citizens, lawful permanent residents, and aliens residing here under color of law.208 Additionally, states determining eligibility and benefit levels must
attribute the income and resources of their United States sponsors to alien families applying for AFDC for three years following
entry.209 Aliens excluded from these requirements are those paroled into the United States as refugees, those granted political
are
asylum, and those admitted as Cuban or Haitian entrants who
2 10
spouse.
sponsor's
the
or
sponsor
the
of
children
dependent
The Agriculture and Food Act of 1981211 also requires that a portion of the income and resources of a person sponsoring entry of a
permanent resident alien be attributed to that alien when he applies for food stamps. Refugees and aliens seeking political asylum are exempted from these restrictions.
The Department of Health and Human Services published proposed regulations 212 governing supplemental security income
benefits (SSI) that also attribute the income and resources of
213
of the
sponsors to aliens in order to conform to amendments
214
Social Security Act.
2 15
have also
Refugee Resettlement Program (RRP) regulations
been amended by the Department of Health and Human Services. 216 New policies have been established concerning the cash
and medical assistance available to refugees, as well as Cuban
and Haitian entrants who are ineligible for AFDC, SSI, and MediC.F.R. parts 316(a), 328, 332, 332(a), 334, 335, 335(b), 336, 339 and 344 to conform to
the naturalization provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments
of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, 95 Stat. 1611. See infra notes 270-75 and accompanying
text.
207. 47 Fed. Reg. 5648 (1982); see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357.
208. 45 C.F.R. § 233.50 (1981). The eligibility limitations of this regulation apply
after September 30, 1980.
209. Id. §§ 233.51-.52 (1981).
210. 47 Fed. Reg. 5680 (1982).
211. Pub. L. No. 97-98, 95 Stat. 1213.
212. 46 Fed. Reg. 60,470 (1981).
213. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-265, 94 Stat.
471.
214. 20 C.F.R. § 416 (1982).
215. 45 C.F.R. § 400 (1982).
216. 47 Fed. Reg. 10,841 (1982).
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caid. These regulations permit one hundred percent federal reimbursement to states providing benefits to eligible refugees during
their first eighteen months in the United States. Benefits for refugees who have been in the United States between eighteen and
thirty-six months may also be reimbursed at the state's
21 7

request.

In Cabral v. State Board of Control,218 undocumented aliens
were held to be eligible for public benefits from California's Victim of Violent Crimes Act. Petitioner, an illegal alien who was injured by street gangs, was awarded compensation for his injuries.
The court rejected the government's argument that undocumented aliens do not qualify as residents under the Act.2 19
PERSECUTION

In McMullen v. INS,220 the Ninth Circuit reversed a BIA decision that McMullen had failed to establish the likelihood of persecution. The court held that the decision was not supported by
substantial evidence. 22 1 Petitioner admitted deportability unless
protected by the Refugee Act of 1980.222 Therefore, proper application of the Act was critical.
Under the Refugee Act, if the petitioner establishes all the necessary elements of the statute, relief should be mandatory. McMullen argued that following enactment of the statute, absolute
discretion of the BIA was inappropriate. 223 The Ninth Circuit
217. Id.
218. 112 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 169 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981).
219. Id. at 1017, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
220. 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981).
221. The Ninth Circuit used McMullen to establish the appropriate standard of
review applicable to BIA findings that no likelihood of persecution exists under
the Refugee Act of 1980. Prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act the BIA exercised broad powers of discretion and the Ninth Circuit accorded deference to the
BIA decisions. 658 F.2d at 1316.
222. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 1253(h) (1) states "[t]he Atsuch alien's
torney General shall not deport or return any alien to a country if...
life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."
223. The changes in the statute require the immigration judge to find the following elements before the alien is protected from deportation:
1) A likelihood of persecution; ....
2) Persecution by the government or by a group which the government
is unable to control
3) Persecution resulting from the petitioner's political beliefs.
4) The petitioner is not a danger or a security risk to the United States.
658 F.2d at 1315 (footnotes omitted).

agreed, ruling that because factual determinations by the BIA are
now required, judicial review of the Board's findings is appropriate.224 However, the reviewing court will limit its inquiry to
whether the Board's determination is supported by substantial
evidence. 225
The court concluded McMullen had met his burden of proof by
presenting extensive evidence of his past association with a faction of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), and that
the PIRA consistently tortured or killed traitors. McMullen was
clearly perceived to be a traitor because he helped the United
States government combat the flow of guns to the PIRA. McMullen also presented evidence that the government of the Republic
of Ireland is unable to control the PIRA. Following the substantial evidence rule, the court reversed the BIA decision and
granted McMullen's petition.2 26
HArnA. REFUGEES
In Louis v. Meissner,22 7 the INS was temporarily enjoined from
administering its exclusion and deportation procedures against
the class of undocumented Haitian aliens who arrived in the
Southern District of Florida on or after May 20, 1980. These aliens
are applying for entry and are presently in detention pending exclusion proceedings, although no orders of exclusion have been
entered against them. The district court found that the plaintiffs'
claims were likely to succeed and that they would suffer irreparable harm if the injunctive relief was not granted.
Class members challenged INS exclusion policies regarding
Haitians who are seeking asylum. These challenged policies include: the denial generally of the right to file for asylum, the denial of the right to have an attorney present at primary
inspection, and the mass scheduling of hearings on 'asylum
claims. 228 Class members also claim that form 1-122, which informs an alien of exclusion proceedings against him and of his
rights during those proceedings, is generally unacceptably trans224. 658 F.2d at 1316.
225. Id. at 1317. Deference to an extent will still exist due to the expertise required in this type of ruling.
226. Id. at 1319.
227. 530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
228. Id. at 926. Plaintiffs seek relief against several alleged practices of the INS.
Specifically challenged are: the continued detention of excludable Haitians by the
INS and the lack of access to attorneys. Included are those aliens held in Miami
facilities in whose behalf notices of appearance have been led, those who have
not specifically engaged attorneys from the center, and those who were sent from
Miami to detention camps in Fort Allen, Puerto Rico, Morgantown, West Virginia,
Lexington, Kentucky, Otisville, New York, and Big Springs, Texas. Id.
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lated, if at all. Moreover, the Haitians claim the INS does not inform them of their right to apply for asylum.2 2 9
Following the issuance of the preliminary injunction, the INS
filed a motion to dismiss.23 0 The district court dismissed several
of the plaintiffs' causes of action when the court ruled it had no
jurisdiction to hear those issues under section 106(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 23 ' The court, however, retained jurisdiction over claims alleging INS violations of the rulemaking
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),232 claims
regarding the Haitians' first amendment rights of access to counsel and counsel's access to the detainees, and claims involving
discriminatory INS detention policies.2 33
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

The Supreme Court denied certiorari2 4 in Blackie's House of
Beef, Inc. v. Castillo,23 5 in which the circuit court of appeals for
the District of Columbia had clarified the law regarding the INS'
authority to issue search warrants for undocumented aliens in
commercial establishments. The INS found deportable alien employees when it searched Blackie's House of Beef pursuant to a
warrant that specified the place, time, and scope of the search but
failed to describe each suspected illegal alien.23

6

Blackie's

claimed a violation of the fourth amendment which requires the
naming of the specific person to be seized.23 7
The court held that the INS' right to enter a commercial establishment to seek violators of immigration laws was implied by its
general statutory power to seek out and question undocumented
aliens. Rather than applying the more stringent criminal probable cause standard, the court held that the appropriate standard
for issuing warrants to the INS is the requirement of specificity
sufficient to prevent unbridled discretion by enforcement offi229. Id. at 928.
230. Louis v. Meissner, 532 F. Supp. 881 (SD. Fla. 1982).
231. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1976). This statute limits judicial review of an alien's
final order of exclusion to a habeas corpus proceeding once he has exhausted his

administrative remedies.
232. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
233. Id.
234. 102 S. Ct. 1432 (1982).
235. 659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
236. Id. at 1216.
237. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

cials.2 3 8 Therefore, prior specification of names or descriptions of
aliens sought is not mandated.
Fourth amendment rights differ when the search shifts from a
commercial establishment to a home. In Illinois Migrant Council
v. Pilliod,239 the Northern District Court of Illinois refused to extend the relaxed probable cause standard established in Blackie's
to searches of dwellings. The required warrants must be based
on the stringent probable cause standard for the search of a
home. 240 The court held that the use of administrative warrants is
limited to the search and seizure of property, not persons, stating:
However, administrative warrants may not be used by the INS to justify
the seizure of persons. Assuming arguendo that Blackie's was correctly
decided and that the INS may utilize an administrative warrant to enter
and search a given commercial location, such a warrant does not authorize
the search or seizure of persons found on the premises.24 1

In Dellums v. Smith,242 a temporary restraining order was issued directing that a minimum of five members of the general
public be admitted to any deportation hearings held in the INS
detention facility in El Centro, California. The court ruled that it
is in the public interest to allow the general public to attend these
hearings in accordance with section 242.16(a) of title 8 of the Code
of Federal Regulations. The court further found that closed hearings may result in irreparable injury to any of the two hundred
Salvadoran members of the class action suit presently detained in
the El Centro facility.
In Adams v. Howerton,243 the Ninth Circuit held that the INS'
refusal to recognize a homosexual marriage and to classify a male
allen as a "spouse" of a male citizen, does not violate the equal
protection component of the fifth amendment's due process
clause. The court found that Congress' decision to confer spousal
status only upon parties of heterosexual marriages is rationally
based and does not offend the due process clause and its equal
protection requirements. Therefore the court declined to enlarge
244
the meaning of "spouse" for immigration purposes.
238. 659 F.2d at 1225.
239. 531 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. IlM1982).
240. Id. at 1017.
241. Id. at 1020.
242. Civ. No. 82.0040-6(M) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 1982).
243. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
244. Id. at 1042. Section 201(a) and 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act establish preferential admissions based on close family relationships, exempting immediate relatives such as spouses of United States citizens from quota limitations. The court found no evidence that Congress, which governs the conferral
of spousal status, intended the exemptions to include homosexual relationships.
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FOREIGN INVESTORS

Section 212(a) (14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act245
was enacted in 1952 to provide strong safeguards for American labor. The statute prevents aliens seeking entry into the United
States from taking jobs for which the Secretary of Labor has determined there are sufficient workers, either United States citizens or resident aliens. 24 6 The statute allows an alien worker to
enter the United States unless the Secretary of Labor acted specifically to exclude him by denying certification pursuant to a sec2 47
tion 212(a) (14) application.
Although the present labor certification procedure does not contain any exceptions, INS regulations provide an investor exemption. The original exemption covered "an alien who will engage in
commercial or agricultural enterprise in which he invested or is
actively in the process of investing a substantial amount of capital
"248

The use of investor exemptions has been severely restricted
since June 1, 1978, when nonpreference visa numbers became
available. As a result, there has been a heightened interest in
treaty investor status and an increased need for a broader analytic framework under which to assess the classification of potential investors.
The Visa Services Office recently summarized existing guidelines and precedential materials for the adjudication of applications for nonimmigrant E-2 treaty investor visas. Eligibility for E2 status requires: nationality of a treaty country, substantial investment in an operating commercial enterprise directed by the
investor, and the investor's intention to depart when his investment concludes or his status otherwise ends.249
245. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14) (Supp. IV 1980).
246. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1952).
247. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14) (Supp. IV 1980). In 1965, section 212(a) (14) was
amended to require that every potential alien laborer obtain certification from the
Secretary of Labor. See Mehta v. INS, 574 F.2d 701, 703 n.3 (2d Cir. 1978).
248. 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b) (4) (1967). In 1973 the original investor regulation was
amended to exempt any alien investor investing at least $10,000 in a commercial or
agricultural enterprise. The alien investor was also required to establish that he
has had at least one year's experience or training qualifying him in his chosen
field of investment. 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b) (4) (1974). In 1976 the minimum investment
was raised to $40,000. 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b) (4) (1977).
249. 5 VISA SERVICES OFFICE, E-2 TREATY INVESTOR VISAS No. 20, 264 265 (1982).

In Gill v. INS,250 the Ninth Circuit held that the BIA had incorrectly defined "actively in the process of investing,"25 1 when it decliied to grant petitioner discretionary relief from deportation
based on his application for investor status. The court established that the pursuit of an ongoing systematic plan to invest is
the crucial criterion, and concluded that the BIA's impermissibly
narrow construction rendered the "actively in the process of in252
vesting" clause ineffective.
Although the petitioner had not invested the required amount
at the time he applied for investor status, he continued to make
subsequent expenditures, indicating a continuing investment pattern. The court found that where probative evidence of such a
pattern is present, the plain language of section 212.8(b) (4) requires a consideration of post-application investments in determining whether the necessary amount has been invested.
In Konishi v. INS,253 the Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA's denial of permanent resident status under the investor exemption to
the 1973 version of labor certification requirement.2X 4 The BIA
was ordered to consider whether petitioner, an artist, could claim
the investor exemption based on his investment in an art gallery
which sold his own work.
In Yui Tsang Cheung v. INS,255 the Ninth Circuit established
that the 1973 version of the investor exemption is not available to
professionals 256 who compete as skilled laborers and invest only
in tools of their trade and auxiliary personnel. The court distinguished an entrepreneur's activities, which are generally unique
to their own enterprise and do not compete with skilled laborers.
In Konishi, the Ninth Circuit suggested its ruling in Yui Tsang
Cheung may not apply to the artist petitioner who it held was
2 5
more of an entrepreneur than a professional 7
In the Eleventh Circuit's decision of Patel v. Minnix,258 the
court found no abuse in the INS' discretionary denial of petitioner's application to change his status from visitor-for-pleasure
to treaty investor. The court declined to substitute its judgment
for that of the INS when substantial evidence supports the administrative ruling.
250. 666 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1982).
251. 8 C.F.R § 212.8(b) (4) (1974).

252. 666 F.2d at 393; see Sanghavi v. INS, 614 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1980).
253. 661 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1981).
254. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.

255. 641 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1981).
256. Professionals in this context include dentists and doctors.

257. 661 F.2d at 820.
258. 663 F.2d 1042 (11th Cir. 1981).
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Petitioner entered the United States for a one-month visit. During this stay he made a substantial real estate investment. The
INS concluded that petitioner had entered with the intent to
transact business and thereby circumvent normal visa procedures. The court ruled that the petitioner has the burden of proof
to establish his status as a treaty investor. Inferences reasonably
drawn from the circumstances of petitioner's investing, and his
production of mere conclusory allegations, provided evidence sufficient to support the INS decision. 259
In Roa v. INS,260 the Fifth Circuit held that the evidence
presented sustained the INS' decision that petitioner failed to
prove his entitlement to the investor exemption from labor certification. The court relied on INS v. Wang,26 ' which ruled that the
alien's proof must be unambiguous and any doubts should be resolved against him.
Roa entered the United States as a nonimmigrant student and
completed his education. He then entered a business partnership
from which he was free to withdraw at any time and in which he
invested only after his original request for permanent status was
denied. The court upheld the INS' inference that the investment
was a sham designed to circumvent immigration laws and Roa
was ruled more of an employee than an investor.2 62
In Mawfi v. INS,263 the Ninth Circuit held that a petition for investor status based on an investment different from that identified in a prior application does not, as a matter of law, constitute a
new petition. The court reasoned that as long as the petitioner
exhibited an intent to comply with investor regulations, he should
be allowed to reasonably improve and change his original
investment.2 64
259. Id. at 1044.
260. 671 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1982).
261. 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
262. 671 F.2d at 118.
263. 671 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1982).
264. Id. at 345. The court reversed the BIA decision which ruled that Mawji's
purchase of a grocery store with the proceeds from the sale of his restaurant resulted in an automatic loss of his priority number and necessitated filing a new
application. Nonpreference visa numbers were available when petitioner originally filed his application. However, while the INS investigated his case and he reinvested, nonpreference visa numbers became unavailable and investor regulations
were amended to require a minimum investment of $40,000. (See supra note 248
and accompanying text.) The court's decision to reverse and remand rested on

BOND PROCEEDINGS

The Matter of VEA265 dealt with the guidelines of imposing delivery bonds and their no-work riders on aliens detained for deportation proceedings. 26 6 The BIA reversed the immigration
judge's custody determination, which imposed a bond of $2,500
with a condition against unauthorized employment when respondent overstayed his nonimmigrant-for-pleasure visa. The BIA released the alien on his own recognizance and cancelled the bond
267
condition against unauthorized employment.
The Board ruled that in deportation proceedings, an alien
should be detained or required to post a bond only when there is
a finding that he is a threat to national security or a poor bail risk.
Respondent was found to be neither, as he had applied for a sixth
preference immigrant visa at a United States embassy abroad and
would be unlikely to harm his chances of gaining readmission as
a permanent resident by failing to depart voluntarily. 268
The Board also held that the no-work rider was inappropriate.
Section 103.6(a) (2) (i/i) of title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations cites the impact of the alien's employment upon the American labor market as a principal factor in imposing the no-work
rider bond. Respondent had previously obtained a labor certification as a precondition to filing his sixth preference visa petition.26 9 Therefore, the Secretary of Labor had already specifically
determined that respondent's employment was not harmful to the
United States labor market.
LEGISLATION

Efficiency Package
The major immigration legislation to emerge from the first session of the 97th Congress was the Immigration and Nationality
Act Amendments of 1981.270 This legislation, known as the "Effithe fact that petitioner's first application had not been adjudicated at the time the
changes in investor status qualifications occurred. 671 F.2d at 344.
265. L &N. Dec. 2890 (1981).
266. Delivery bonds are imposed to ensure that an alien will personally appear
as required by the INS. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6 (1982). The addition of the no-work rider
bond against unauthorized employment is strictly regulated because of the burden
it places on an individual in requiring him to pay the delivery bond while being
barred from employment until his deportation hearing. Id. § 103.6(a) (2) (iii)
(1982).

267. L &N.Dec. 2890 at 6.

268. Id. at 5-6.
269. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(c) (1) (1982). For a discussion of sixth preference status
see supra note 177.
270. Pub. L. No. 97-116, 95 Stat. 1611.
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ciency Package," provides measures designed to expedite administrative action and reduce governmental expenditures.
Significant statutory changes resulting from these amendments
include:
Section 2: Raises from fourteen to sixteen years the age by which
the adoption of an alien child must take place to qualify for immigration benefits.
Section 3: Removes adultery as an absolute bar to finding good
moral character. Conviction of a single offense of possession of
thirty grams or less of marijuana is also no longer an absolute
bar.
Section 5: Eliminates the need for a deported alien to apply for
permission to reapply once five years have elapsed since the
deportation.
Section 7: Empowers the Attorney General to waive inadmissibility for a single offense of simple possession of thirty grams or
less of marijuana.
Section 9: Permits issuance of reentry permits for a nonrenewable period up to two years.
Section 10: Permits deportation of an excluded alien to countries
other than the one from which he came.
Section 11: Makes fraud waiver discretionary rather than
mandatory. This relief is restricted to aliens in possession of an
immigrant visa or its equivalent and is unavailable to undocumented and nonimmigrant entrants.
Section 12: Also provides for a discretionary hardship waiver of
deportability for an alien convicted of a single offense of simple
possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana if the alien has a
spouse, parent or child who is a United States citizen or permanent resident alien who would suffer extreme hardship from the
alien's deportation.
Section 15: Eliminates the present annual reporting requirement
of registered aliens, requiring only a notice of change of address
within ten days.
Section 16: Strengthens the power of the INS in seizing and
forfeiting conveyances used in smuggling aliens.
Section 18: Provides the spouse and children of a permanent resident alien required by employment to be abroad with the same
treatment as the principal alien for the purpose of preventing a
break in the continuous residence required for naturalization.
Section 19: Abolishes the requirement of two character witnesses

in naturalization proceedings. It also eliminates the thirty-day
waiting period between filing a naturalization petition and issuance of the naturalization certificate.
Section 21: Requires a showing of compelling reasons demonstrating that the alien is unable to return to his country of accreditation and that the adjustment would be in the national
interest.
Proposed Legislation
Two major bills affecting immigration have been introduced this
year. The Reagan administration proposal and the Simpson-Mazzoli bills would, if passed by Congress, make substantial changes
to the present INA.
The administration's bill, cited as the Omnibus Immigration
Control Act,271 contains both provisions for permanent amend-

ments and temporary changes not incorporated into general immigration legislation.2 72 The ten major sections of this bill follow.
Title One: Temporary Resident Status for Illegal Aliens
Permits legalization of the status of undocumented aliens who
entered the United States before January 1, 1980.
Title Two: Unlawful Employment of Aliens Act of 1981
Restricts employment opportunities for aliens not lawfully entitled to employment by imposing sanctions on employers.
Title Three: Cuban/Haitian Temporary Resident Status
This Title, which does not amend the Immigration and Nationality Act itself, grants temporary resident status to Cuban and
Haitian nationals.
Title Four- Fair and Expeditious Appeal, Asylum and Exclusion
Act of 1981
Revises provisions relating to exclusion procedure, judicial review and asylum.
Title Five: Immigrant Visas for Canada and Mexico Act
Creates separate numerical limits of 40,000 each on immigration
from Canada and Mexico.
Title Six: Temporary Mexican Workers Act
Establishes a two-year program for temporary admission of up
to 50,000 Mexican nationals per year to work in jobs for which
there is a shortage of United States workers.
Title Seven: Immigration Emergency Act
271. Introduced in the Senate October 22, 1981, as S. 1765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982), by Senator Strom Thurmond and in the House on the same day as H.R.
4832, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), by Representative Peter W. Rodino.
272. 58 INTERPRETER RELEASES 550-60 (1981).
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Enables the government to cope with emergencies such as the
1980 Cuban Flotilla.
Title Eight: Unauthorized Entry and Transportation Act
Designed to prevent surreptitious entry of undocumented
aliens.
Title Nine: Labor Certification Act
Allows the Secretary of Labor to use labor market information
without reference to the specific job opportunity for which labor
certification is sought.
Title Ten: Emergency Interdiction Act
Authorizes the President and Attorney General to take actions
on the high seas to prevent illegal immigration to the United
States. When admissibility determinations are made before
aliens have landed in the United States, the aliens are not entitled to such protections as judicial review of decisions by immigration judges.
The Simpson-Mazzoli bil1273 also proposes major changes in the

present law.2 74 Highlights of the bill follow.
Employer Sanctions: Provides more severe penalties than the administration's bill for knowingly hiring even one unauthorized
alien.
Hearing and Adjudication: Proposes establishment of a six-member United States Immigration Board within the Department of
Justice to replace the BIA.
Asylum: Reduces the period in which asylum must be applied for
to within fourteen days of notification of the start of exclusion
or deportation proceedings.
Judicial Review: Limits the time to petition for review in the
court of appeals from six months to thirty days. Asylum decisions are not subject to judicial review except as permitted by
habeas corpus under the Constitution.
Adjustment of Status: Eliminates the availability of adjustment
of status to an alien who has failed to maintain a continuous legal status since entry into the United States.
273. Introduced in the Senate on March 17, 1982, as S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982), by Senator Alan K. Simpson and in the House on the same day as H.R.
5872, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), by Representative Romano L. MazzolL The
House bill was renumbered as H.IR 6514 after being reported out by the House
Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law.
274. 59 INTERPRETER RELEASES 207-47, 248-58 (1982).

Legal Immigration: Establishes the annual ceiling at 425,000 and
creates two categories:
1. Family reunification: 325,000
2. Independents: 100,000
Amerasian Children: Provides two thousand special immigration
visas per year for five years for children fathered by United
States servicemen in Korea, Laos, Vietnam, and Kampuchea.
Nonimmigrants: Revises the current temporary worker (H-2) program to create a streamlined program for agriculture.
Legalization: Creates a one-time opportunity for adjustment of
status for both unlawful aliens and lawful temporary residents.
Numerous other bills with less impact in the immigration area
have been introduced into the second session of the 97th
2 75
Congress.
SILVA LETrER

A final order was entered in the Silva 276 case on December 18,
1981, ending the program. The order reinstated Silva class members to the status they held when the permanent injunction was
entered on March 10, 1977.277 The final order insured those with
voluntary departure status continuance of at least thirty days following notice of the program's termination. The order also ensured continued employment authorization pending receipt of
written notice of the revocation of such authorization.
The final order does not jeopardize the claims of denial of rights
under the Silva program, but does limit INS action in expelling
Silva class members. The number of undocumented Mexican
aliens who will lose their Silva protection against deportation
may run into the tens of thousands.2 78 Many may be eligible for
suspension of deportation due to their long stay and American9
born children. 27
CONCLUSION

The past year was extremely active at all levels pertaining to
the field of immigration law. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
illegal aliens receiving a free public education. However, this
275. For a general discussion, see 59 INTERPRETER RELEASES 77-78 (1982).
276. See 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 418 (1979).
277. Id.
278. 59 INTERPRETER RELEASES 5 (1982).

279. See supra notes 270-75 and accompanying text. The Reagan administration's immigration proposals in S. 1765 and H.R. 4832, supra note 271, could also
provide relief for most of the affected Mexican aliens through the amnesty and
Mexican visa provisions.

Synopsis

[voL. 20: 191, 1982]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

trend in favor of aliens was not consistent as the Court upheld a
California statute which bars aliens from becoming peace officers.
In the criminal procedure area, the Court decided that the INS
policy of quick deportation outweighs the criminal defendant's
witness requirements if the government has determined the deportable alien has no material evidence. The Court delayed until
the next Term addressing the constitutionality of the one-house
congressional veto of suspension of deportation.
In response to budgetary constraints, Congress passed the "efficiency package," streamlining INS procedures, saving both time
and money. The Reagan administration proposed major changes
in the immigration laws, including amnesty for illegal aliens currently in the United States. In addition, there was a major bill
sponsored by members of Congress, some aspects of which were
more liberal to aliens than the President's proposal.
Circuit courts continue to hear an increasing number of immigration cases. This trend may further divide authority in the respective circuits on a number of issues. This, in turn, may prompt
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a .higher proportion of
immigration cases. Estoppel is one particular area in need of
Supreme Court guidance.
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